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THE GREEk EURO TRAGEDy 
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On 4 February 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) unexpectedly and 
suddenly cancelled acceptance of Greek bonds as collateral for liquidity funding 
unless Greece obeyed the Troika agreement.  
 
The ECB’s irresponsible and incompetent actions call into question their respect for the 
Greek government’s attempts to resolve its debt crisis in a sustainable way. The ECB 
may or may not have good reasons to cut off Greece, depending on your point of view, 
but it is clear that such a move would be political. A central bank that is supposed to be 
the lender of last resort and guardian of financial stability would be taking a deliberate 
and calculated decision to undermine the Greek banking system. The ECB is now seen 
in some quarters as arrogant, unaccountable and authoritarian.1
This Strategic Update discusses the most recent problems for the Eurozone, namely the 
Greek crisis and the European Central Bank’s (ECB) lack of democratic accountability 
which has contributed to considerable difficulties for the stability of the Eurozone.
The policy designed for the rescue of the Greek economy, was in fact intended to 
punish the country for its alleged “profligacy,” rather than serve as a way out of the 
crisis. If the Eurozone and the EU cannot resolve a relatively small problem the size of 
Greece, what is the point of Europe as a political and economic concept? It is worth 
asking again at this critical stage who is most to blame, because that question is so 
often asked in the wrong way. 
Greece’s Syriza party was composed of inexperienced politicians who would in 
normal circumstances have been a minority party on the opposition benches without 
the responsibility of government. It is therefore not surprising that members of the 
party made unrealistic decisions, and that they lacked judgment due to their limited 
experience. So the question therefore really is who was on the other side of the 
negotiations? There were many experienced prime ministers, finance ministers, and 
high level technocrats with years of experience at domestic, European and international 
politics. In fact, a highly talented group with skill and expertise, which has produced 
what? The unresolved Greek crisis in the Eurozone. 
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The Euro, although ‘a currency without a state’, is backed by significant political and even 
state-like commitments. That the Euro must be saved at all costs is an imperative suggested 
not only by ECB president Mario Draghi, the technocrat, but German chancellor Angela 
Merkel, the statesman. Political elites, particularly in Germany, have staked their legacy on  
its success.2  
But there is a growing mismatch between the monetary and fiscal sides of the Eurozone 
governance system and this has led to a number of problems. The main problem is that, 
while we may not find it easy to live with the ECB, we cannot live without it. Yet, when we 
look at the Greek bailout programmes, it is easy to conclude that they have failed. The Troika 
has imposed austerity, which has led to a severe contraction of output and highly adverse 
welfare effects. This was intended, in a way, to punish Greece for its profligacy rather than 
serve as a way out of the crisis.3 
 
The ECB is far more independent than the US Federal Reserve, whose legal status is far 
weaker and which is directly accountable to Congress and the government. The ECB 
was supposed to be like the German central bank, the Bundesbank. It has, however, 
failed to emulate the distinctive attributes that made the Bundesbank successful, such as 
accountability and interdependence with other democratic institutions. The Maastricht 
Treaty, which defines the role of the ECB, says that the ECB has a primary mandate to 
maintain stable prices. It also says that, “where it is possible without compromising the 
mandate to maintain price stability”, the ECB will also support the “general economic 
policy of the EU” which includes, among others, “steady, non-inflationary and 
environmentally friendly growth” and “a high level of employment”. However, the emphasis 
is explicitly on price stability. The ECB can justly claim to have held together a poorly 
designed system in difficult circumstances. But the mission creep is its own responsibility.  
The ECB, in fact, is the least accountable central bank among advanced nations.4 There is no 
democratic accountability when the ECB strong-arms governments into policy actions that 
go well beyond any reasonable interpretation of its mandate. Not only is the ECB shielded 
from politicians, ECB statutes have also placed it beyond the reach of democratic rules 
on bad behaviour. The ultimate control politicians have over a central bank is the power 
to change its statutes and the power to appoint governors. For example, in the case of 
Germany, a simple majority in the Bundestag can change Bundesbank law. This procedure 
is absent in the Eurozone. The statutes of the ECB can only be changed by revising the 
Maastricht Treaty, which requires unanimity of all member states. The ECB today argues that 
the only institution that has the right to limit its power is the European Court of Justice, 
which has an activist Europhile interpretation of European treaties. The crisis has given the 
ECB governing council such an increased power that no national government or national 
institution can match it. 
 
 
John Ryan 3 
The project of European integration was not designed democratically, or at least not in 
the way democracy is traditionally conceived in terms of placing ultimate law-making 
authority in the hands of the people or their elected representatives. It is not even 
meant to be democratically responsive in the way that term is usually understood. 
Any democratic deficit that the EU suffers seems to many observers a deliberately 
constructed one. So how could we control the ECB in the future? It needs to be placed 
under a stricter and more direct supervision by democratically elected politicians. One 
of the institutions the president of the ECB puts himself in front of, the European 
Parliament, does not inspire anyone to believe that the ECB is being held accountable. 
This very independence means that democratic governments now have no way to keep 
the ECB accountable if it starts to violate its mandate.5
With almost prophetic insight German economist and former president of the 
Bundesbank Karl Otto Pöhl wrote in 1988: 
In a monetary union with irreversibly fixed exchange rates the weak 
would become ever weaker and the strong ever stronger. We would 
thus experience great tensions in the real economy of Europe ...  
In order to create a European currency, the governments and parliaments 
of Europe would have to be prepared to transfer sovereign rights to a 
supranational institution.6
The ECB’s new policy focus arguably makes sense, up to a point. However, the change 
in its mission introduced by Outright Monetary Transactions has profound political 
consequences. The ECB has become more powerful than the Fed, but with even less 
democratic oversight. In the early stages of the crisis, the ECB exercised its influence 
through secret letters to troubled member states such as Ireland and Italy, laying down 
conditions and implicitly threatening to withdraw support if they were not met. Now, 
the bank exercises its power directly and in public.7
 
 
DEmOCRACy PlAyS SECOnD FIDDlE TO TECHnOCRACy 
At the moment, the ECB is both politicized and free from external political control. In 
principle, it is hard to see how this is sustainable over the long term. Politicians and 
bureaucrats are already crafting proposals to introduce greater democratic controls over 
economic policy. But it is equally hard to see how things can change, given Germany’s 
principled attachment to central bank independence, and its entirely practical attraction 
to an arrangement under which the EU’s more troublesome states will be disciplined 
without Germany getting all the blame. If the history of Europe is any guide, then such 
apparently irrational arrangements can persist for a very long time indeed.8 What it 
means, rather, is more of the same sub-optimal performance that has plagued Europe 
since the crisis began, including sluggish growth, persistent unemployment and financial 
instability. The Eurozone will endure, but it will not prosper.9
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In November 2010, in a letter to the Irish Finance Minister, the ECB threatened to cut off 
liquidity support for Irish banks unless the government agreed to a financial assistance 
programme with the EU and the IMF.10  The letter also made demands in the areas of fiscal 
austerity and structural reform that were not only beyond the ECB’s remit but were also 
wrong for Ireland’s circumstances.
The ECB threatened to decline its responsibility in seeking to force the Irish Government into 
the Troika programme in November 2010, and threatened again (this time under Draghi’s 
leadership) in the case of Cyprus in 2013. It is unclear whether the ECB’s role in designing 
and monitoring programme conditionality relating to fiscal policy and structural reforms is 
consistent with its legal mandate. 
The ECB should explain why it was necessary for it to be a formal member of the Troika 
group. The history of ECB involvement in Ireland and in the 2015 Greek crisis shows that as 
long as its lender of last resort role remains as confused as it currently is, questions about 
whether the ECB is acting beyond its legal mandate and becoming overly involved in political 
and economic policy will provoke questions about its legitimacy and unaccountability.11
On 28 June 2015, the ECB capped the availability of liquidity support to Greek banks 
deemed solvent by its supervisory arm as they faced a depositor run. They had to close, and 
the Greek government had to impose exchange controls. 
While the ECB’s hard-money mandate is immutable and the Bank is far more ‘independent’ 
than was even the Bundesbank, this very independence means Germany now has no way 
to keep the ECB accountable if it starts to violate its mandate. The Governing Council can 
at any time, with a majority vote, decide the fate of at least half a dozen governments, 
supporting them or bringing them down – and that number is increasing. The ECB has to be 
placed under a stricter and more direct supervision by democratically elected politicians. The 
independence of central banks had initially been granted in order to enable them to provide 
their core product – monetary stability.12
The ECB is the least accountable central bank among advanced nations. Its degree of 
independence has only one precedence: the Reichsbank, a central bank with one of history’s 
most disastrous records. This sounds a strong note of caution, as a number of important 
issues require further research, before  a  hasty  decision  is  made  by  any  country  about  
handing over monetary policy control to the ECB.
Now the European project is in real trouble with out-of- touch domestic and European political 
elites and an establishment unable to address the concerns of public opinion.   Many people no 
longer trust mainstream politicians, EU technocrats and elites in general. They seem captured 
by vested interests and incapable of improving the life of ordinary people, let alone setting out 
a compelling vision of a brighter future. Politics is turning nasty, fractious and inward-looking – 
with unpredictable consequences.13 
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The ECB’s deep involvement in the fiscal affairs of distressed European Monetary Union 
(EMU) member states raises serious questions about its policy independence, despite the 
protections of the Maastricht Treaty. As a member (along with the European Commission 
and the IMF) of the Troika assessing the Greek, Irish and Portuguese fiscal programmes, the 
ECB’s credibility depends at least partly on the evolution of those programmes.  
 
Concerns about a sovereign default and ensuing contagion have led ECB officials to favour 
restructuring schemes that effectively undermine the risk-mitigation role of credit default 
swaps.14 And the ECB has agreed – partly in response to pressure from EMU member states 
– to forgo profits on its Greek debt holdings in order to lower the costs to EMU countries 
of the second Greek bailout. The fig leaf of not accepting losses on the Greek debt – and 
thereby not engaging in monetary finance of a distressed government – is unlikely to 
persuade sceptics of ECB independence. Finally, the ECB’s unlimited supply of long-term 
liquidity to Eurozone banks, beginning in December 2011, was only a modest step from 
the more direct acquisition of government debts. In various ways, the ECB lowered the bar 
for future interventions in the debt of fiscally distressed member states. The ECB’s policy 
of quantitative easing (QE) has been buying government bonds of the Eurozone countries 
since March 2015. 
The ECB has bought about €645 billion in government bonds. And it has announced 
that it will continue to do so, at an accelerated monthly rate, until at least March 2017. 
Greece is excluded from the QE programme, and thus from the debt relief that arises 
as a result of this programme. It would be wise to allow the QE programme to include 
Greece which is struggling under the burden of high levels of unstainable debt in the 
same way as the other Eurozone countries that have been enjoying stealth debt relief 
organised by the ECB.15 
 
 
THE GRExIT COnUnDRUm 
When German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble placed the possibility of ‘Grexit’ 
on the table, the nature of the game change fundamentally. He dispelled the illusion 
that the Euro is irreversible for each and every country.16 Even though it is too early to 
say precisely where this will end, it will be suggested in conclusion that this signposts 
a fundamental but as yet uncharted mutation in the constitution of EMU: The Euro is 
irreversible not in its composition, but in its ideology. In other words, in the final battle, 
austerity wins.
The governor of the Central Bank of Greece, Yiannis Stournaras wrote his annual 
report and forwarded it to the Greek Parliament and Tsipras’ cabinet. Never before has 
such a “monetary policy” report been published by the central bank of a developed 
country, or indeed any country. It is a political assault on its own elected government.17 
Zoe Konstantopoulou, the speaker of the Greek parliament, rejected the document as 
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“unacceptable”. Furious Syriza MPs called it an attempt to strike terror. Yannis Stournaras, 
the central bank’s governor, is not a neutral figure. He was finance minister in the previous 
conservative government.18
In the power struggle between Greece and its creditors, the ECB was stoking the bank 
run as a means of applying pressure to the Greek government. The ECB seemed to make 
the same sort of ‘offer you can’t refuse’ that it made to bring Ireland and Cyprus to heel: 
that bank support in the form of the ELA would be withdrawn (leading to a collapse 
of the banking system, and in Greece’s case, a disorderly ‘Grexit’ of capital controls, 
nationalization of banks, and issuance of drachma to fill the banks’ balance sheet hole) 
unless the government took specific actions set forth by the ECB. Given the much 
greater size and visibility of the Greek crisis, it is unlikely for the ECB to engage in this 
type of pressure unless (or perhaps more accurately, until) it has plenty of political cover. 
Nevertheless, the Greek central bank report seemed to be an effort to pour gas on the 
ongoing fire of the bank run, particularly since Greek citizens were losing confidence in 
the Syriza negotiating strategy.19 
Discussions of ‘Grexit’ were given credibility by the fact that an extended period of 
capital controls would possibly lead the Greek government to decide to introduce its own 
currency. Members of the ECB Governing Council, including Executive Board member 
Benoit Coeure, encouraged the perception that this process could end with Greece 
leaving the Euro by freely admitting this was a possibility. ECB officials insisted that they 
were being forced by their own rules to cut off liquidity support for Greek banks. This is 
simply untrue.20
With a focus on the solvency of the Greek banks and the need to encourage financial 
stability, the ECB and European governments could have handled the situation in Greece 
in a very different manner. As long as the ECB’s lender of last resort role remains as 
confused as it currently is, questions about whether the ECB is acting beyond its legal 
mandate and becoming overly involved in political developments will continue to be aired. 
Germany is clearly opposed to any significant debt relief measures. Furthermore, if 
these were to be considered at all, it would be after the programme ended and only if 
seriously required. On the other, the IMF made its continued participation conditional 
on guaranteeing the sustainability of Greek debt. Given the dire economic prospects of 
Greece, explained in detail in the preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) published 
by the IMF before the Eurogroup meeting, the scale of measures on debt relief it 
envisioned was clearly incompatible with the German position.21
According to economics professor Costas Lapavitsas, Syriza failed not because austerity 
is invincible, nor because radical change is impossible, but because, disastrously, it was 
unwilling and unprepared to put up a direct challenge to the Euro. Radical change and 
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the abandonment of austerity in Europe require direct confrontation with the monetary 
union itself. For smaller countries this means preparing to exit, for core countries it 
means accepting decisive changes to dysfunctional monetary arrangements.22
 
The IMF has articulated a view to Eurozone governments during 2016 that they need 
to take action to alleviate Greece’s debt burden. The IMF’s participation in Greece’s  
international bailout – a decision that is causing anxiety among EU nations such 
as Germany, which see the fund’s participation as vital to the rescue programme’s 
legitimacy has still to be resolved.
COnClUSIOn
The Eurozone, in its relatively short time of existence, has successfully overcome a 
number of crisis periods. As the political landscape is changing, it will be difficult to 
develop more constructive and proactive solutions for the Eurozone crisis, such as 
debt restructuring, than was the case with the ‘muddling-through’ approach that has 
characterised the Eurozone crisis strategy in the last few years, especially in Greece. 
The ECB epitomizes that perceived ‘democratic deficit’ run by an unaccountable 
bureaucracy that poses serious problems for the future of the Eurozone.23 
If mutualisation of at least a part of member states’ debt issuance were to happen, the 
Eurozone would be taking a big stride towards a large, liquid, integrated bond market 
like that of the United States, which makes the dollar such an attractive key currency. 
As such, it would partly address the complaint that the Euro is a currency without a 
state and so by definition lacks the independent fiscal capacity that is a fundamental 
characteristic of a reserve currency. 24
 
There is an urgent need for the Eurozone to address their problems such as the Greek 
debt restructuring process as a matter of urgency or it could be a destabilising factor 
in the international currency system. The Eurogroup failed to implement a definitive 
solution to the Greek debt problem. This is yet more evidence that the current 
institutional structure of the Eurozone/EU is unable to deal with the scale of economic 
problems caused by an incomplete monetary union: an ill omen for the future of Greece 
and, indeed, the Eurozone/EU. 
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